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One important function of financial inter-
mediaries and markets is liquidity provision. 
Transaction costs and information frictions may 
prevent private agents from contracting and trad-
ing with each other in order to channel resources 
from investors with excess liquidity to financing 
constrained firms with funding needs. Financial 
intermediaries and dealers on financial markets 
offer specialized services to facilitate transac-
tions of  privately issued financial assets, thus 
providing liquidity and affecting asset prices. 
In view of frictional asset markets, publicly cre-
ated liquidity, such as fiat money, provides an 
alternative—albeit low yielding—hedge against 
financing constraints.
Nevertheless, the macroeconomic literature 
rarely studies private liquidity provision jointly 
with its asset pricing implications. This paper 
explores the macroeconomic impact of endog-
enous liquidity provision through the financial 
sector. We model financial intermediation as a 
specific competitive search process (see, e.g., 
Moen 1997 on competitive search in labor 
markets and Rocheteau and Weill 2011 for a 
survey of search frictions and asset liquidity). 
Importantly, search frictions generate endoge-
nous asset liquidity and financing constraints. 
Liquidity conditions, in turn, affect asset prices. 
Therefore, asset liquidity and prices vary with 
aggregate conditions and feed into real alloca-
tions. We show, in particular, that less liquid pri-
vate capital markets are associated with stronger 
demand for public liquidity and tighter financing 
constraints, depressing real economic activities.
I. The Model
Consider an economy consisting of a con-
tinuum of households (with a continuum of 
members), firms, and financial intermediaries, 
each with measure one. Household members 
are subject to idiosyncratic investment risks as 
in Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Shi (2015). 
Time is discrete and denoted by  t = 0, 1, 2, … . 
Each period is divided into four  subperiods.
The Household’s Decision Period.—The 
aggregate productivity shock  A t is realized. All 
members in a representative household equally 
divide the household’s financial assets con-
sisting of money and privately issued financial 
claims. The household instructs its members on 
the optimal  type-specific choices to be carried 
out after types have been realized.
The Production Period.—Each member 
receives a status draw, becoming an entrepreneur (type  i ) with probability  χ and a worker (type  n ), 
otherwise. Workers supply labor, and only entre-
preneurs have access to investment projects. 
Competitive firms rent aggregate capital stock 
K t and labor  N t from households to produce 
numeraire consumption goods  Y t =  A t F ( K t ,  N t ) , 
where  F ( K t ,  N t )  =  K t α N t 1−α and  α ∈ (0, 1) . The 
rental rate of capital and the wage rate are
(1)  r t =  A t  F K ( K t ,  N t ) and  w t =  A t  F N ( K t ,  N t ) .
The Investment Period.—There is no insurance 
among household members as they keep sepa-
rated until the consumption stage. Entrepreneurs 
seek financing and undertake investment proj-
ects, transforming consumption goods into cap-
ital stock  one-for-one. Capital markets open in 
which entrepreneurs offer financial claims for 
sale and workers purchase claims. Asset trans-
actions are implemented by financial intermedi-
aries and subject to costly search and matching. 
Financial intermediaries charge a fee for their 
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search technology. Private financial claims are 
thus only partially liquid. Money, in fixed sup-
ply  
_
 B and traded on a frictionless spot market, 
is fully liquid. Throughout the paper, we focus 
on the type of equilibrium where there are gains 
from trading both private claims and money.
The Consumption Period.—Entrepreneurs 
and workers reunite again in their respective 
households, pool all assets together, and equally 
share consumption goods across all members.
A. A Representative Household
Preferences.—The household derives  per- 
period utility  u ( C t ) from total household con-
sumption  C t , where  u′(·) > 0 and  u′′(·) < 0 . 
The household’s preferences are represented by 
 E 0  ∑ t=0 ∞  β t u ( C t ) , where  E is the expectation 
operator and  β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Households’ Wealth.—Households hold fully 
liquid money with the nominal price  P t . In addi-
tion, physical capital ( K t ), earning the rental 
return  r t , is owned by households and depreci-
ates to  (1 − δ) K t at the end of each period where δ ∈ (0, 1) . There is a financial claim to the future 
return of every unit of capital. For example, 
the owner of one unit of claims issued at time 
t − 1 is entitled to  r t at  t ,  (1 − δ) r t+1 at time 
 t + 1 ,  (1 − δ) 2 r t+2 at time  t + 2 , … . For 
simplicity, we follow Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and normalize the claims by the cap-
ital stock, such that they depreciate at the 
same rate  δ , but earn a return  r t+s at any date 
 t + s ( ∀ s ≥ 0 ).
Hence, each household owns a portfolio of 
money, private claims issued by other house-
holds, and the fraction of their own capital 
which has not been issued. The latter has the 
same liquidity as claims previously issued, 
since claims to unissued capital would need to 
be traded on the same capital markets as exist-
ing claims. Therefore, besides liquid assets 
B t , we only need to keep track of net private 
claims defined as  S t =  claims on others’ capi-
tal + unissued capital.
Asset Accumulation.—Let  S t 
j and  B t 
j denote 
the total net private claims and money belong-
ing to household members of type  j ∈ {i, n} 
at the beginning of  t . As all assets are equally 
divided among members, we have  S t 
i = χ  S t , 
S t 
n = (1 − χ) S t ,  B t i = χ B t , and  B t n =  (1 − χ) B t 
by the law of large numbers.
Let  S t+1 j and  B t+1 j denote the total 
 end-of-period net private claims and money for 
type  j members. Then,  S t+1 =  S t+1 i +  S t+1 n and 
 B t+1 =  B t+1 i +  B t+1 n as household members pool 
assets together at the end of  t . Further, house-
hold members face two financing constraints. 
First, no private agent can issue money, i.e.,
(2)  B t+1 j ≥ 0. 
Second, for each group, the net  private-claims 
position evolves according to
(3)  S t+1 j =  (1 − δ) S  t j +  I  t j −  M  t j,
where  I  t 
j is physical investment and  M  t 
j is the 
quantity of private claims sold. Due to search 
frictions on  private-claims markets, only an 
endogenously determined fraction  ϕ t ∈ (0, 1) of 
new or existing assets can be issued or resold. 
 ϕ t thus captures asset saleability. Then, (3) 
implies the second financing constraint:
(4)  S  t+1 j ≥ (1 −  ϕ t ) [ I  t j +  (1 − δ) S  t j ] .
That is, agents need to retain the  non-saleable 
fraction  (1 −  ϕ t ) of their existing private claims 
and claims issued against new capital, thus lim-
iting the external funding for new investment.
The Workers’  Flow-of-Funds Constraint.—
For simplicity, labor supply  N t is fixed at  N 
–
. 
Workers do not invest ( I  t n = 0 ). They accumu-
late financial assets ( M  t n < 0 and  B t+1 n > 0 ) 
to implement their household’s consumption 
smoothing plans. Hence, neither of their financ-
ing constraints is binding. They use labor income ( w t  N t ) and the return on money ( B t n =  (1 − χ) B t ) 
and private claims ( S t n =  (1 − χ) S t ) to finance 
consumption ( C t n ), new money holdings ( B t+1 i ) , 
and the purchase of private claims (− M t n ):
(5)  C t n +   B t+1 
n 
 _ P t 
 −  q t n M t n =  w t  N t +   B t 
n 
 ___ P t 
 +  r t  S t n , 
where private claims are purchased at the price 
q t 
n , while money is valued in real terms at  1/ P t .
The Entrepreneurs’  Flow-of-Funds Con-
straint.—Entrepreneurs need to finance new 
investment  ( I t i > 0 ). They can use the return on 
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money ( B t i = χ B t ) and private claims ( S t i = χ S t ), 
and the proceeds from the issuance (or reselling) 
of private claims ( M t i =  I t i +  (1 − δ) S t i −  S t+1 i ) 
to finance consumption ( C t i ), new money hold-
ings ( B t+1 i ), and physical investment ( I t i ):
(6)  C t i +   B t+1 
i 
 _ P t 
 +  I t i =  q t i M t i +   B t 
i 
 _ P t 
+  r t  S t i , 
where private claims are issued or resold at the 
price  q t 
i . Note  q t 
i is Tobin’s  q , i.e., the ratio of the 
market value of capital to the replacement cost (i.e., unity).  q t i ≥ 1 , otherwise entrepreneurs 
prefer  self-financing. If  q t 
i > 1 , entrepreneurs 
will use all available resources to create new 
capital. We assume and later verify that  q t 
i > 1 . 
 That is, both financing constraints (2) and (4) 
bind, and entrepreneurs do not bring consump-
tion goods back to their household ( C t i = 0 ).
Hence,  S t+1 i =  (1 −  ϕ t ) [ I t i +  (1 − δ) S t j ] ac- 
cording to (4), and we can express investment 
as  I t 
i =  [ S t+1 i − (1 −  ϕ t ) (1 − δ) S t j ] / (1 −  ϕ t ) . 
Then, (6) becomes
(7)  q t r S t+1 i =   B t 
i 
 _ P t 
+  [ r t +  (1 − δ)]  S t i ,
where the  right-hand side is total  net-worth, and 
S t+1 i on the  left-hand side is valued at  q t r , the 
effective replacement cost of private assets:
(8)  q t r ≡  1 −  ϕ t  q t 
i 
 _
1 −  ϕ t  < 1 .
For every unit of new investment, a fraction  ϕ t 
is issued at price  q t 
i ; entrepreneurs need to make 
a “ down-payment” ( 1 −  ϕ t  q t i ) and retain a frac-
tion ( 1 −  ϕ t ) as inside equity claims. The lower 
q t 
r is, the more claims to capital entrepreneurs 
can return to their household.
Once we know  S t+1 i from (7), aggregate 
investment  I t =  I t i can be backed out as
(9)  I t =   [ r t +  (1 − δ) ϕ t  q t 
i ] χ  S t + χ B t / P t 
   ______________________
1 −  ϕ t  q t i  . 
As  (1 − δ) ϕ t  q t i χ S t is the saleable fraction of old 
claims, entrepreneurs can “leverage” their liquid 
 net-worth with a factor  (1 −  ϕ t  q t i ) −1 to invest in 
new capital.
The Household’s Problem.—For convenience, 
let  ρ t be the ratio of the purchasing price to the 
effective replacement cost:
(10)  ρ t ≡   q t 
n 
 _
 q t 
r 
=  (1 −  ϕ t ) q t n  _
1 −  ϕ t  q t i  .
By multiplying (7) with  ρ t and adding (5), we 
then derive the household budget constraint
(11)   C t +   B t+1  _ P t  +  q t 
n S t+1 =  w t  N t 
 +  (χ ρ t + 1 − χ) (  B t  _ P t +  r t  S t ) 
 +  [χ ρ t +  (1 − χ) q t n ] (1 − δ) S t ,
where we have used the fact that  S t+1 =  S t+1 i + 
S t+1 n ,  B t+1 =  B t+1 i +  B t+1 n ,  C t =  C t i +  C t n , and 
 C t 
i =  B t+1 i = 0 . Let  J ( S t ,  B t ;  Γ t ) be the value 
function of a household with private claims  S t 
and money stock  B t , given the aggregate state Γ t ≡ ( K t ,  A t ) . Then,  J satisfies the following 
Bellman equation
 J ( S t ,  B t ;  Γ t ) = 
 max 
 { C t ,  S t+1 ,  B t+1 } 
 
 
 {u ( C t ) + βE [J ( S t+1 ,  B t+1 ;  Γ t+1 ) | Γ t ] } 
s.t.   (11). 
B. Capital Markets and Financial 
Intermediation
Search and Matching.—There are capi-
tal  submarkets  m = 1, 2, … with free entry. 
As we shall see, the number of  submarkets 
is not important for our analysis. On each 
market, entrepreneurs post  U t 
m units of sell 
offers backed by capital stock. Intermediaries 
screen  submarkets for valuable projects to 
invest in. Posting buy quotes  V t 
m on a particu-
lar  submarket comes at a cost of  κ per unit of 
quotes.
In order to match their buy quotes with suit-
able sell quotes in a submarket  m , intermediaries 
operate a matching technology that determines 
the number of matched claims  M t 
m 
  M t 
m = M ( U  t m ,  V  t m )  = ξ ( U t m ) η ( V  t m ) 1−η ,
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where  ξ is matching efficiency and  η is the 
matching elasticity. The matching technology 
endogenizes the probabilities of filling a sell 
quote,  ϕ t m ≡ M ( U t m ,  V t m ) / U t m , and, conversely, 
of filling a buy quote,   f  t 
m ≡ M ( U t m ,  V t m ) / V t m . 
Therefore,
(12)  f  t m =  ξ  1 _ 1−η ( ϕ t m )  η _ η−1 .
Then,  θ t m ≡  V t m / U t m =  ξ  1 _ η−1 ( ϕ t m )  1 _ 1−η is the 
search intensity of  submarket  m and positively 
 co-moves with  ϕ t m . To maximize external fund-
ing, entrepreneurs post quotes amounting to 
 U t 
m =  I t i +  (1 − δ) χ S t , of which  ϕ t m U t m can be 
sold.  ϕ t m , indeed, captures asset saleability.
Financial Intermediation.—Matched claims 
are further intermediated. Financial intermedi-
aries can sell one unit of claims, acquired from 
entrepreneurs at the price  q t 
i, m , to other interme-
diaries on the same capital  submarket  m at the 
price  q t 
m . Since only a fraction  f  t 
m of buy quotes 
is matched, the cost of selling one unit of claims 
is  κ/ f  t m . Because of the competitive environ-
ment, the following  zero-profit condition must 
then hold in each  submarket:
(13)  κ _ 
 f  t 
m 
=  q t m −  q t i, m .
Alternatively, intermediaries can sell claims 
trading at price  q t 
m on  submarket  m to workers 
at price  q t 
n, m . However, entrepreneurs must be 
monitored such that financial claims are even-
tually backed by capital stock. Only intermedi-
aries have the capacity to monitor entrepreneurs 
at a cost of  κ per unit of sell quotes posted by 
entrepreneurs. Since only a fraction  ϕ t m of sell 
quotes is matched, the cost of selling one unit of 
claims to workers is  κ/ ϕ t m . We thus have another 
 zero-profit condition:
(14)  κ _ 
 ϕ t m =  q t 
n, m −  q t m .
Given these features of the intermediation 
process, each  submarket is characterized by its 
 saleability-sell-price pair  ( ϕ t m ,  q t i, m ) . In light of 
the two  zero-profit conditions above, intermedi-
aries are indifferent between all  submarkets. In 
addition, workers go to the  submarket with the 
lowest  q t 
n, m . We can thus omit the superscript  m .
Asset Price.—Entrepreneurs choose the 
 submarket in which to post their sell offers, by 
minimizing the effective replacement cost  q t 
r , 
subject to the relationship between  f t and  ϕ t and 
the  zero-profit condition (13):
  min 
 { ϕ t ,  q t i } 
 
 
  q t 
r =  1 −  ϕ t  q t i  _
1 −  ϕ t  ,   s.t.   (12) , and (13) ,
where again the superscript  m is omitted. Doing 
so maximizes the  end-of-period private claims 
S t+1 i , according to (7). The optimal solution (see 
the proof in the online Appendix) yields
(15)  q t i = 1 +  κη _ 1 − η  
 (1 −  ϕ t ) 
 _
 f t 
 ≥ 1. 
We thus verify that  q t 
i > 1 when  κ > 0 . Using 
the two  zero-profit conditions (13) and (14) 
together, we can eliminate  q t and obtain
(16)  q t n −  q t i = κ ( 1 _ f t +  1 _  ϕ t ) .  
Therefore, the spread  q t 
n −  q t i depends on both 
the search cost  κ and the market structure.
II. Equilibrium with Two Types of Assets
When κ → 0 private assets provide sufficient 
liquidity, as (15), (16), and (10) jointly imply 
that  q t 
i =  q t n =  q t r =  ρ t = 1 . Money is, there-
fore, not valued as a lubricant for investment 
financing, such that  B t+1 / P t = 0 . The efficient 
level of investment can be implemented by issu-
ing private claims only, and our model resem-
bles a standard real business cycle model.
Instread, we focus on the particular type 
of equilibrium, in which money and private 
claims  co-exist. This type of equilibrium will 
exist, whenever the intermediation cost  κ is 
large enough for money to relax entrepreneurs’ 
financing constraints, while at the same time 
being sufficiently small, such that the issuance 
of private claims remains profitable.
Portfolio Choices.—We can define the return 
from private claims by forwarding the budget 
constraints of workers (5) and entrepreneurs (7) 
by one period. Let  r t+1 ni ≡  [ r t+1 +  (1 − δ) ] / q t n 
be the return on private claims purchased 
at  t from the point of view of a worker, 
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who becomes an entrepreneur at  t + 1 . Let 
 r t+1 nn ≡  [ r t+1 +  (1 − δ)  q t+1 n ] / q t n be the corre-
sponding return if the worker does not change her 
type. The household’s optimal portfolio choices 
for money and private financial assets yield two 
 liquidity-adjusted asset pricing formulae:
(17)  1 =  E t [ Δ t+1  χ ρ t+1 + 1 − χ  ___________ P t+1 / P t  ] 
 =  E t [ Δ t+1 [χ ρ t+1 r t+1 ni +  (1 − χ) r t+1 nn ] ] , 
where  Δ t+1 ≡ βu′( C t+1 )/u′( C t ) is the stochastic 
discount factor.
A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is 
a mapping  Γ t ≡ ( K t ,  A t ) →  Γ t+1 , with con-
sumption, investment, and portfolio choices { C t ,  I t ,  S t+1 ,  B t+1 } , asset market structures  { ϕ t ,  f t } , 
a collection of prices  { ρ t ,  q t i ,  q t n ,  P t ,  w t ,  r t } , and 
with an exogenous process for  { A t } , such that: 
firms’ optimality conditions in (1) hold; given 
prices, the policy functions solve the represen-
tative household’s problem, satisfying (10), (11), and (17);  I t is determined by (9);   K t+1 =  (1 − δ)  K t +  I t ,  S t =  K t , and  B t =  B – ; the 
asset search market “clears”: (12), (15), and (16) hold.
III. Asset Liquidity and the Macroeconomy
We focus on the  long-run equilibrium featur-
ing both private claims and money.
Liquidity Premium.—When money is val-
ued by investors (workers), it relaxes their 
future financing constraints. To see this, con-
sider the asset pricing formula for money (17). 
In the steady state, this condition implies that 
[χρ + 1 − χ]  P t / P t+1 =  β −1 . As money is 
in fixed supply,  P t =  P t+1 in the steady state. 
Therefore,
  ρ =  ρ ∗ ≡ 1 +  ( β −1 − 1) /χ > 1, 
or by definition,  q n / q r =  ρ ∗ > 1 . This means 
that the cost of private claims for workers 
exceeds that of entrepreneurs, as the latter can-
not issue as many private assets as they would 
desire and remain financially constrained.
In view of binding financing constraints, 
investors will demand a higher return from 
 holding only partially resaleable private claims 
relative to money. As a result, a positive liquidity 
premium emerges between the returns on private 
claims and money, defined as
 Δ t LP ≡  E t [χ r t+1 ni +  (1 − χ) r t+1 nn ] −  E t [  P t  _  P t+1 ] .
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose  κ > 0 and pri-
vate claims and money  coexist. Then,  r/ q n > δ 
and money provides a liquidity service in a 
neighborhood around the steady state. The 
 steady-state liquidity premium amounts to  Δ LP 
= [1 −  ( ρ ∗ ) −1 ]  (r/ q n − δ) (1 − χ) > 0 .
The proof (in the online Appendix) basi-
cally uses the two asset pricing formu-
lae in (17), which imply that the two assets 
earn the same return after adjusting  ρ . 
With money in fixed supply, we must have 
 ρ =  ρ ∗ > 1 , and the equilibrium thus features a 
liquidity premium.
Asset Saleability and Prices.—The liquidity 
of private claims depends both on their price and 
their physical saleability. In fact, both dimen-
sions are related as the  steady-state asset price  q i 
is a function of asset saleability  ϕ . Specifically, 
we can rewrite (15) by using (12) as
(18)  q i = 1 +  κη ξ   
1 _ η−1 
 _
1 − η  ϕ  
η
 _ 1−η (1 − ϕ) . 
Further, since money is valued in the 
 coexistence type of equilibrium,  ρ =  ρ ∗ is 
uniquely pinned down as discussed above. 
Using the definition  ρ =  q n / q r , we know that
(19)  (1 − ϕ) q n − ρ (1 − ϕ q i ) = 0 ,
where  q i satisfies (18) and we know from (12) 
and (16) that  q n =  q i + κ [ ϕ −1 +  ξ  1 _ η−1  ϕ  η _ 1−η ] . 
Then, (19) determines  ϕ , as  q n and  q i are func-
tions of  ϕ only.
Importantly, (19) could admit multiple solu-
tions for  ϕ . For instance, if  η = 1/2 , (19) 
becomes a quartic equation of the unknown  ϕ (see the online Appendix). Then, multiple val-
ues of  ϕ ∈ (0, 1) could solve (19), implying 
multiple  co-existence equilibria. Intuitively, the 
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competitive asset search process may generate 
multiplicity, as coordination between sellers 
and buyers on different  submarkets of private 
claims may lead to different outcomes. As a 
comparison, the random search framework of 
Cui and Radde (2016) only features a unique 
 co-existence equilibrium.
Whether a lower level of the  steady-state 
equilibrium saleability  ϕ (or search intensity  θ ) 
gives rise to a lower asset price  q i depends on 
the relative strength of asset supply and asset 
demand effects: on the one hand, a lower level of ϕ implies tighter financing constraints and less 
supply relative to demand on the asset search 
market. As intermediaries have to offer more 
attractive conditions to attract scarce supply, this 
raises the equilibrium asset price. On the other 
hand, lower equilibrium asset saleability implies 
that private assets are less effective invest-
ments to hedge future funding needs, which 
would reduce demand, increase the equilib-
rium liquidity premium, and compress the asset 
price.
Which effect dominates depends on the 
parameters of the economy. Notice that with 
 ∂ q i /∂ ϕ = κη (1 − η) −2  f −1 ϕ  η _ 1−η (η/ϕ − 1) , we 
obtain a sufficient condition for  q i and  ϕ to 
 positively  comove:
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose there are mul-
tiple values of asset saleability  ϕ ∈ (0, 1) 
that solve (19). If  ϕ < η, ∀ ϕ ∈  (0, 1) , then 
 ∂ q i /∂ ϕ > 0 .
Intuitively, when  ϕ is sufficiently small, the 
low hedging value of private claims is asso-
ciated with a high sensitivity of asset demand 
from workers to market conditions. As a 
result, the demand effect dominates the sup-
ply effect, such that a lower level  ϕ is associ-
ated with a higher liquidity premium and thus a 
lower  q i .
The Macroeconomy.—When both  ϕ and  q i 
fall, aggregate investment in (9) falls, because 
both liquid  net-worth and leverage drop. That is, 
an economy with particularly illiquid asset mar-
kets simultaneously features a low asset price 
and tighter financing constraints—and thus less 
investment. This result illustrates the effect of 
asset illiquidity via financing constraints on real 
allocations.
IV. A Numerical Example
The following example highlights that coor-
dination on financial markets strongly impacts 
asset liquidity and portfolio allocations between 
private and public financial assets, thus signifi-
cantly affecting real economic activity.
Let  η = 0.5 . Set  β = 0.99 ,  δ = 0.03 , and α = 0.33 as in a standard calibration for a quar-
terly macro model. Following Shi (2015) and 
interpreting  χ as the fraction of firms that has 
investment opportunities each quarter, we set χ = 0.056  in line with Doms and Dunne (1998). 
Finally, set  ξ = 0.2 and  κ = 0.01 such that 
q i = 1.05 and the annualized  liquidity  premium 
amounts to 50 basis points in the equilibrium 
with the most liquid asset markets. Then,
  ϕ 1 = 0.0685  and   ϕ 2 = 0.2828 
solve (19) which is a quartic equation (see the 
online Appendix for details). That is, private 
financial markets are active, but exhibit different 
degrees of liquidity (or search intensity). The cor-
responding (real) value of money  B/P is around 
88.64 percent lower in the equilibrium with more 
liquid and active asset markets. In other words, as 
the liquidity of private financial markets improves, 
agents value public liquidity substantially less.
In both equilibria  ϕ < η , such that Proposition 
2 implies that the equilibrium  q i will be higher if ϕ is higher. In fact, when  the steady-state salea-
bility increases from  ϕ 1 to  ϕ 2 , the asset price  q i 
increases from  1.02 to  1.05 , while the liquid-
ity premium decreases by 5 basis points. Also 
note that  ϕ < 0.5 seems empirically plausible 
according to Del Negro et al. (2011), as other-
wise all claims would have a  turn-over rate of 
more than 50 percent within a quarter.
By affecting asset liquidity, participation 
decisions in the financial market can, thus, have 
a strong impact on firms’ financing constraints, 
capital accumulation, and output. In our numer-
ical example, investment, consumption, and out-
put increase by  7.02 percent ,  3.06 percent , and 
2.26 percent , respectively, as steady-state salea-
bility switches from  ϕ 1 to  ϕ 2 .
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